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ABSTRACT 
  Lawyering has changed dramatically in the past century, but 
scholarly and regulatory models have failed to keep pace. Because 
these models focus exclusively on the “practice of law” as defined by 
the profession, they ignore many types of work that today’s lawyers 
perform and many sources of ethical tension they encounter. To 
address these shortcomings, I examine significant twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century social dynamics that are fundamentally altering 
contemporary lawyers’ work by broadening and blurring the 
boundary between law and business. Within the resulting boundary 
zone, a growing number of lawyers occupy roles for which legal 
training is valuable but licensure is not required. I argue that the 
ambiguity surrounding these roles—regarding what constitutes legal 
practice, what roles lawyers play, and what professional obligations 
attach—creates opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers and for 
ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate clients. The proliferation 
of these roles gives rise to key ethical tensions, ignored by existing 
models of the profession, that threaten to extinguish the profession’s 
public-facing orientation in favor of its private interests. I conclude 
that we cannot effectively understand and regulate the twenty-first-
century legal profession until we move beyond the rigid constraints of 
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existing models and begin to study the full range of roles and work 
settings—both in and out of practice—that today’s lawyers occupy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 24, 2005, nine individuals were indicted1 for their 
involvement in the KPMG tax scandal, described as the “largest tax-
evasion scheme in U.S. history.”2 These nine individuals played a 
central role in designing and marketing fraudulent tax shelters that 
generated $12 billion in phony losses and cost the Internal Revenue 
Service $2.5 billion in lost taxes.3 Although only one of the nine was 
technically practicing law, five others were licensed lawyers.4 These 
five lawyers were out of practice but very much in business. 
The lawyer wrongdoing and resulting harm in this example are 
extreme, but the pervasive presence of lawyers throughout corporate 
 
 1. Sealed Indictment at 5–6, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 2007) 
(05 Crim. 888), 2005 WL 6142978. 
 2. Terry Frieden, Former KPMG Executives Indicted, CNN MONEY (Aug. 30, 2005, 8:20 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/30/news/fortune500/kpmg. KPMG later entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $456 million in penalties. Id. 
 3. Id. These nine men were employed by KPMG in a wide range of roles, including as 
high-level tax executives, operators of subsidiary shell companies, and as purportedly 
independent advisors. Sealed Indictment, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
 4. Sealed Indictment, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
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life has become routine. For several decades, lawyers have been 
moving out of law firms and courtrooms and into new legal practice 
settings in business and government.5 Today, they are increasingly 
moving out of practice and into quasi-legal roles, defined loosely as 
roles at the intersection of law and business for which legal training is 
valuable but licensure is not required.6 Although lawyers working in 
these roles exert considerable influence on the shape and orientation 
of the legal profession, scholars and regulators underestimate their 
significance.7 Even as the profession has grown, changed, and 
fractured in recent decades, the prevailing models of the profession 
have remained fixed—structured around the fiction of crisp and clear 
boundaries between law and business. 
The first of these models, the traditional unitary model, lies at 
the foundation of the profession’s current regulatory system.8 It posits 
a single, unified profession comprised of lawyers who share more 
commonalities than differences.9 Based on these commonalities, the 
model prescribes, and our current system has, a single, broadly 
applicable code of conduct.10 The second of these models, the 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile 
of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 355, 369 (1994). 
 6. Broadly speaking, the term “quasi-legal role” encompasses any job for which a law 
degree and licensure are advantageous but not required, whether or not the job is associated 
with legal practice and the legal profession. The term therefore encompasses, but is not 
necessarily limited to, what the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) refers to as 
JD Advantage jobs. See Employment for the Class of 2011—Selected Findings, NAT’L ASS’N FOR 
L. PLACEMENT 2–3 (2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf 
(“Employment in business accounted for 18.1% of jobs, the highest that NALP has measured, 
and up from 15.1% for the Class of 2010. The percentage of jobs in business had been in the 10–
14% range for most of the two decades prior to 2010, except in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
when it dipped below 10%. About 29% of these jobs were reported as requiring bar passage, 
and about 37% were reported as jobs for which a JD was an advantage.”); see also Class of 2011 
National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/
uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf (reporting these figures in table format). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 385–86 (1994) 
(“[T]he Model Rules continue the Model Codes’ basic approach of considering lawyers’ duties 
to be uniform, whatever role the lawyer plays.”).  
 9. See David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the 
Role of Context in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
CONTEXT 25, 26 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (“The organized bar has long 
conceived of the practice of law as fundamentally a ‘generalist’ profession in which differences 
among lawyering roles are largely unimportant with respect to the task of defining professional 
norms, or even assessing professional competence.”).  
 10. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393–403 (1988) 
(“[T]he standard conception . . . accurately represents leading themes in the official rules of the 
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segmented model, recognizes and accounts for the growing 
fragmentation and specialization in lawyers’ work. It posits a 
collection of discrete subprofessions, each ideally governed by a 
distinct regulatory regime and a context-specific code of conduct.11 
These models have a common shortcoming. Both focus narrowly 
and exclusively on the “practice of law,” which encompasses work 
previously subsumed within the profession’s jurisdiction and included 
within its monopoly. As a result, both models ignore one of the most 
significant sources of change and ethical tension in the contemporary 
legal profession: the evolving relationship between legal practice and 
business practice. 
In this Article, I argue that we cannot understand the shape and 
orientation of today’s legal profession without understanding the 
bar’s changing approach to defining and defending its boundaries. 
The organized bar was once intent on drawing sharp distinctions 
between law and business, but the rise of the regulatory state changed 
the playing field.12 As regulation came to pervade society, new kinds 
of work and roles proliferated. Law and business grew together, and a 
murky and ambiguous boundary zone replaced the once-crisp 
demarcation between the two. Today’s quasi-legal roles, embraced by 
many lawyers and encouraged by the organized bar, exist in this 
broadened and blurred boundary zone in which legal training and 
licensure are valuable but professional ethical obligations are unclear. 
Ambiguity surrounding lawyers’ work in this quasi-legal zone—
regarding what constitutes legal practice, what role a lawyer plays, 
and when professional rules attach—gives rise to key ethical tensions 
ignored by existing models of the profession. This ambiguity creates 
opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers who seek to evade 
ethical obligations and for ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate 
clients who seek to access legal expertise without the strictures of 
professional regulation. It calls into question the profession’s 
legitimacy, and it suggests a worrisome answer to a question 
frequently asked in the wake of the KPMG tax shelter incident and 
 
American legal profession.”); see also Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of 
Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1020–36 (2004) (“[I]ndeterminacy and 
lack of accountability arise in large part from the dominant . . . paradigm of legal ethics that 
informs the bar-drafted rules of professional conduct.”). See generally infra Part I.A.  
 11. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1149–50 (1993). See generally infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
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other recent scandals: “Where were all the lawyers?”13 The 
uncomfortable answer is that the lawyers were there amidst the 
scandal, but they had abandoned their previous roles as 
intermediaries between state and society in favor of new roles 
straddling law and business. Their work in these quasi-legal roles 
represents a new and thus far unrecognized domain in lawyers’ 
corporate work. 
This Article builds upon existing models of the profession to 
account for the proliferation of lawyers’ quasi-legal work. I begin in 
Part I by reviewing and critiquing existing models of the profession. I 
then demonstrate that the traditional and segmented models each 
overlook a significant historical trend influencing the work of today’s 
lawyers: the emergence of a quasi-legal boundary zone between law 
and business. In Part II, I analyze core ethical tensions that arise from 
the work of licensed lawyers in quasi-legal roles—work that is 
excluded from existing regulatory regimes of professional regulation. 
I argue that the proliferation of quasi-legal roles permits sophisticated 
corporate clients to reap the benefits of the profession’s monopoly 
while the public bears a disproportionate share of the burdens. In 
Part III, I call for new forms of professional regulation to address 
these tensions. I propose that by combining insights from the 
traditional and segmented models, we can overcome the weaknesses 
of each, bringing clarity to lawyers’ work and ethical obligations in 
quasi-legal roles. There is room—as well as need—for broad ethical 
principles that bind all lawyers together, alongside context-specific 
regulations that govern particular practice areas and work settings. 
I.  EXISTING MODELS OF THE PROFESSION 
The traditional model of the legal profession, eschewed by most 
scholars but still espoused by bar leaders,14 posits a single profession 
 
 13. The question was first posed by Judge Stanley Sporkin in Lincoln Savings & Loan 
Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990), but has been repeated many times since. See, 
e.g., Ashby Jones, Where Were the Lawyers?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2007, 8:52 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/02/where-were-the-lawyers; Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis 
2008: Where Were the Lawyers?, DCBAR (Jan. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2010-financial-crisis.cfm; Richard Moorhead, 
Hackgate: Where Were the Lawyers?, LAW. WATCH (July 10, 2011), 
http://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/hackgate-where-were-the-lawyers. 
 14. Leaders of the ABA and state bars have long maintained that a single set of ethical 
rules and a single regulatory regime are appropriate for all segments of the profession. See 
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 385–86. 
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regulated through barriers to entry and a uniform code of conduct. In 
contrast, current scholarship advances a segmented model, comprised 
of a number of subprofessions, each ideally governed by a distinct, 
context-specific code of conduct. Although these two approaches 
diverge significantly in their descriptive and prescriptive positions, 
they address the same normative question of how to organize and 
regulate lawyers’ work so as to achieve balance among the 
profession’s tripartite obligations to clients, the state, and the public. 
In this Part, I review these two models and then address a common 
and fundamental shortcoming: their narrow focus on the practice of 
law. Because of this focus, both models ignore the emergence and 
significance of the hybrid, quasi-legal zone between business and law. 
A. The Traditional Model 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as 
lawyers were asserting themselves as an organized profession, bar 
leaders developed and promoted the traditional or unitary model of 
the legal profession.15 At its base is a social contract: in exchange for 
special expertise, heightened ethical standards, and devotion to the 
public interest, lawyers enjoy self-regulatory authority and a state-
granted monopoly over legal practice.16 
Early bar leaders explained that these necessary features of 
professional status supported the bar’s ideal role in society.17 
Monopoly power allowed the bar to limit entry so as to protect the 
public from unqualified, incompetent, and unethical practitioners. 
Self-regulatory authority allowed the bar to maintain autonomy from 
both the state and private interests so as to protect lawyers’ 
independent legal judgment.18 In theory, these features of 
 
 15. See id. at 338 (“The American Bar Association . . . attempted to set a uniform standard 
for lawyer conduct in . . . 1908 . . . .”). 
 16. See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1323–24 
(2009).  
 17. See id.; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1981) (“Since its inception in the early 1930s, the bar’s campaign against the unauthorized 
practice of law has been characterized by its partisans as a selfless enterprise actuated solely by 
considerations of ‘public interest and welfare.’” (quoting Comm. on Evaluation of the Nat’l 
Conference on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law, Address at the National Conference on 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law (May 25–26, 1962), in AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: TEXT OF ADDRESSES OF SPEAKERS 
153 (1962))). 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 11 (2013). 
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professionalization prepared and empowered the bar to ensure 
qualified, competent, and ethical lawyers who bolstered the rule of 
law, mediated between state and society, and protected individual 
rights.19 
The organized bar developed three interlocking regulatory 
elements to effectuate this vision of the profession: barriers to entry, 
statutes governing the unauthorized practice of law, and codes of 
ethical conduct. In the early decades of the twentieth century, bar 
leaders pursued the first of these elements by convincing state 
licensing authorities to adopt the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
entry standards.20 The ABA’s requirements included law school 
education, bar examination passage, and approval by a character-and-
fitness committee. These requirements promoted professional unity 
by ensuring that all lawyers would share common training, 
commitments, and acculturation.21 Throughout much of the twentieth 
century, they also sanctioned homogeneity by impeding the inclusion 
of immigrants, minorities, and women.22 
While promoting uniformity within the profession, bar leaders 
drew sharp boundaries around its edges through the second 
interlocking element of regulation: the unauthorized-practice-of-law 
statutes.23 Bar leaders first persuaded state legislatures to criminalize 
the practice of law by unlicensed practitioners and then formed 
enforcement committees to identify and pursue violations.24 Bar 
leaders cited three principal explanations for their efforts: the 
specialized and state-constitutive nature of legal work, lawyers’ 
unique competency to engage in that work, and the importance of 
 
 19. See id.; Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1281, 1281–82 (2003). 
 20. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 47 (1989). 
 21. See id. at 47, 223. 
 22. JERALD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 108 (1976). Subsequently, the bar opened 
its doors to members of these previously excluded groups, but continued to control entry to 
ensure quality and to limit competition. As Professor Bruce Green has explained, “over time, 
the effect of the bar association rulings became less to protect the professional elite from lower-
class competitors than to protect all lawyers against competition from nonlawyers . . . and, 
beyond that, to expand lawyers’ turf.” Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on 
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the 
Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1144 (2000). 
 23. See JOHN F. SUTTON, JR. & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 231–41 (1989); Rhode, supra note 17, at 3. 
 24. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of 
the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2583–84 (1999). 
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protecting the public from incompetent and unethical legal service 
providers.25 
The third interlocking element of regulation entailed the 
promulgation of a single, broadly applicable code of conduct. In 1908, 
the ABA issued the Canons of Ethics (Canons), its first official 
statement on appropriate standards of professional conduct.26 The 
Canons expressed a single vision of lawyers’ work based on 
courtroom practice.27 They articulated strong duties of confidentiality, 
loyalty, and care to clients, while also recognizing lawyers’ obligations 
to the state as officers of the court and to the public as supporters of a 
just legal system.28 The ABA premised the Canons on what Professor 
Fred Zacharias termed the “fictions of symmetry”—the notion that 
all lawyers are equally competent, that all clients are similar, and that, 
as a result, “all lawyers should be governed by the same rules, 
regardless of whom they represent or in what context.”29 
By focusing on the readily observable and carefully regulated 
context of the courtroom, the Canons presented a coherent and 
compelling picture of how the bar’s system of self-regulation balanced 
lawyers’ competing duties to clients, the state, and the public. In the 
courtroom, lawyers express their duties to clients through zealous 
advocacy. They express their duties to the state by supporting court 
proceedings and following court procedures. And they express their 
duties to third parties and the public by complying with prescribed 
standards of fair dealing in interactions with opposing and third 
parties.30 By drawing attention to the courtroom, the bar thus 
demonstrated how its system of self-regulation balanced lawyers’ 
 
 25. See generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES 
AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1986). These considerations continue to justify 
unauthorized-practice-of-law (UPL) statutes today. See, e.g., Denckla, supra note 24, at 2594 
(“The notion that permitting nonlawyers to practice law would harm clients rests on two basic 
assumptions: (1) under UPL rules, lawyers are more likely to protect client interests than 
nonlawyers would without UPL rules; and (2) clients would be worse off without UPL rules.”). 
 26. LUBAN, supra note 10, at 393–403; see Fisher, supra note 10, at 1040. 
 27. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986) (“[The Canons] speak 
of a kind of law practice that was carried on almost entirely in the courtroom.”). 
 28. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl., Canons 1, 6 (1908). 
 29. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting 
Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 838 
(2002).  
 30. Though it was not entirely necessary to focus on the courtroom context to appreciate 
this, lawyers’ public orientation was also expressed through their role in the overall function of 
litigation as a means of fair and effective dispute resolution.  
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tripartite duties in furtherance of rule-of-law values.31 In theory if not 
in practice, represented litigants—rich or poor, urban or rural, 
sophisticated or unsophisticated—could enter the courtroom on equal 
footing, knowing that regardless of power or personal circumstances, 
the law would treat them equally.32 
Even at the height of professionalization, therefore, the unitary 
model was likely a mix of reality and rhetoric. Most lawyers at the 
time were, in fact, courtroom lawyers,33 but a nontrivial number also 
engaged in contract drafting, estate planning, and basic transactional 
work.34 Notwithstanding these varied roles, it served the profession’s 
interests to promote lawyers as uniform and unified, bound together 
by common training, work, and professional norms.35 Doing so 
provided a powerful justification for the profession’s monopoly over 
legal practice. It also drew attention to the public forum of the 
courtroom, where the profession’s system of regulation was relatively 
effective in balancing and constraining lawyers’ competing duties. 
Throughout the twentieth century and even to today, bar leaders 
continue to embrace this traditional unitary model. Although the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) now govern in 
place of the Canons, the ABA and state bars insist that a single set of 
ethical rules and a single regulatory regime are appropriate for all 
 
 31. The “rule of law” is an ambiguous and contested phrase, used here to refer to system-
wide values created by a legal framework “based on law, not men”—values that include a 
moderate state, a strong and engaged civil society, and basic individual freedoms. See Terence 
C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley, The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political 
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1, 10–12 (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien 
Karpik & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2007). The bar’s interlocking elements of regulation were 
advanced as supporting these values by providing society with a cadre of legal professionals who 
had special expertise, heightened ethical standards, and a commitment to the public interest, 
and who would ensure the integrity of court proceedings and of the legal system writ large. 
 32. See Rhode, supra note 16, at 1324  
 33. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 54; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Ethical Standards of the Bar, 
Address at the American Bar Association Regional Meeting 4 (Oct. 22, 1964), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellspeeches/7 (“In 1908 the typical lawyer was a 
general practitioner, usually alone, who divided his time between the courts and a family type of 
office practice.”).  
 34. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 54 n.26. 
 35. The “principle of regulatory uniformity” has been referred to as “‘one of the legal 
profession’s most important constitutive beliefs’ and also its ‘most dramatic delusion.’” Scott R. 
Peppet, Lawyer’s Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal 
Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 503 (2005) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Wilkins, supra note 11, at 1148; Zacharias, supra note 29, at 841). 
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segments of the profession.36 Notwithstanding limited amendments 
addressing transactional work,37 these governing codes of conduct 
continue to focus overwhelmingly on litigation.38 The ABA goes a 
step further, urging lawyers to strive to improve the profession, which 
it describes as unitary.39 For decades, however, the bar’s actual and 
rhetorical push toward uniformity has belied significant change and 
growing complexity in our legal system. 
B. The Segmented Model 
During the 1980s and 1990s, even as bar leaders continued to 
embrace the traditional model, commentators began to question it. 
Social scientists observed that significant twentieth-century changes 
in law and society had prompted an expansion and corresponding 
diversification of lawyers’ work.40 They placed particular emphasis on 
the emergence and growth of two organizational forms, which 
generated new kinds and an increased volume of legal work: the large 
 
 36. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386. Specialty bar associations and lawyers’ groups, such 
as the American College of Trusts and Estates Lawyers and the American Association of 
Matrimonial Lawyers, have formulated commentary on the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules) to tailor them to specific areas of law, but neither the ABA nor state 
bars have adopted or endorsed this type of context-specific guidance. See Lynn Mather & Craig 
A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The Challenges of Divorce Practice, in 
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 9, at 63, 63.  
 37. The current Model Rules ostensibly recognize that not all lawyers are litigators. They 
include provisions that address the lawyer as advisor, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
RR. 1.2, 1.4, 2.1 (2013), negotiator, see id. R. 4.1, and mediator, see id. R. 2.2. Rule 1.13 
addresses the particular challenges of entity representation. See id. R. 1.13. The preamble also 
purports to recognize the significance of context. See id. pmbl., para. 9 (distinguishing the 
various functions of a lawyer and suggesting that contentious ethical issues “be resolved through 
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles 
underlying the Rules”). Still, the Model Rules perpetuate the traditional approach of viewing 
the profession as unitary and the duties of lawyers as uniform, based on litigation. See 
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 385–86. 
 38. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 1042–43 (describing the Model Rules’ reliance “exclusively 
on the adversarial litigation role model” and “the primacy of trial lawyers’ . . . concepts of 
zealous advocacy of, and unswerving loyalty to, the client”). 
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
 40. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 1 (Nw. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1994) (1982) [hereinafter HEINZ & 
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS]; JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. 
SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR 7–8 (2005) [hereinafter HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS]. As many scholars have 
noted, there has always been some diversity within the profession. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra 
note 27, at 54–55. Accordingly, these twentieth-century developments increased and changed—
but did not necessarily create—variation among lawyers’ roles and work.  
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commercial enterprise and the administrative bureaucracy.41 The 
former called upon lawyers to address novel and complex corporate 
restructurings, tax and antitrust issues, and bond offerings; the latter, 
to undertake new types of individual and institutional representations 
associated with the rise of the regulatory state.42 
The bar responded by changing the structure of legal education 
to produce more lawyers and by developing the large, differentiated 
law firm to maximize efficiency.43 Many newly trained lawyers moved 
out of traditional roles as courtroom litigators and into countless new 
roles as transactional lawyers and government advisors.44 During this 
shift, some lawyers were pulled into new roles, while others pushed 
out to them.45 In both cases, the bar incorporated much of this new 
corporate and government work within the definition of legal 
practice, dramatically expanding the profession’s jurisdiction.46 
Observing these changes in an influential 1982 study, sociologists 
John Heinz and Edward Laumann concluded that “the simple view of 
the bar as a single, unified profession no longer fits the facts.”47 They 
theorized that the late twentieth-century bar had fragmented into two 
hemispheres, differentiated by the type of client. In the “personal-
plight” hemisphere, lawyers who generally came from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds provided legal services to individuals and 
small businesses.48 In the “corporate hemisphere,” by contrast, elite 
 
 41. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF 
EXPERT LABOR 248 (1988). 
 42. See id. at 248–49 (describing how lawyers’ work grew increasingly diverse as lawyers 
engaged in activities “ranging from personal matters associated with the welfare state’s 
involvement in housing and education to the corporate business generated by the state’s 
regulatory intrusions into the economy”). 
 43. See id. at 252–53. 
 44. See PATRICK SCHMIDT, LAWYERS AND REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 13 (2005); Nelson, supra note 5, at 355, 369.  
 45. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private 
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 429–49 (1993) (discussing the development of the 
poison pill and noting that “law firms did not passively wait for clients to ask them for 
prescriptions for a poison pill but proactively marketed their particular brand through client 
memoranda and presentations to boards of directors”). See generally Yves Dezalay, The Big 
Bang and the Law: The Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field, THEORY 
CULTURE & SOC’Y, June 1990, at 279 (documenting corporate lawyers’ entrepreneurial 
activities in promoting new products and services to clients, with the effect of further increasing 
demand and further expanding their fields of influence). 
 46. See ABBOTT, supra note 41, at 249 (“Potential legal jurisdictions in [the late nineteenth 
century] . . . grew rapidly.”). 
 47. HEINZ & LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS, supra note 40, at 1. 
 48. Id. at 330. 
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law school graduates and members of influential law firms 
represented corporations, labor unions, and other complex 
organizational clients.49 
Legal commentators in the 1990s built on Heinz and Laumann’s 
descriptive work with normative projects addressing professional 
regulation. In a series of seminal articles, Professor David Wilkins 
criticized the bar’s continued reliance on the traditional model of a 
unitary profession.50 He accepted the value of conduct rules in 
balancing lawyers’ competing obligations to clients, the state, and the 
public, but he questioned the ability of a single code to cover diverse 
areas of legal practice. Wilkins therefore proposed a system of 
context-specific rules to govern different practice areas.51 Such a 
system, he argued, could preserve the benefits of professional 
regulation while addressing the increasing fragmentation and 
specialization of the bar.52 
To illustrate how to develop context-specific rules, Wilkins 
examined the charges that the Office of Thrift Supervision brought 
against the law firm Kaye Scholer, in 1990, for failure to disclose 
problems with the underwriting and investment practices of its client, 
Lincoln Savings & Loan.53 Wilkins suggested that, because lawyers 
who represent federally insured savings institutions play a critical role 
in maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking system, they 
should owe correspondingly heightened duties of candor to the 
tribunal to safeguard the public interest.54 He argued, however, that 
 
 49. Id. at 328. Professor John Heinz, Professor Edward Laumann, and two new 
collaborators set out to update their study in the 1990s. In the findings they published in 2005, 
they concluded that the two hemispheres had grown further apart, as it had become increasingly 
uncommon for lawyers to cross between them. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS, supra note 40, 
at 8. They also reported that the corporate hemisphere had grown at a much faster pace than 
the personal-plight hemisphere but had begun to fragment based on the area of law and the 
requisite skill specialization. Id. at 7–8. 
 50. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990) 
[hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism]; Wilkins, supra note 11; David B. Wilkins, Who Should 
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).  
 51. He referred to these rules as “middle-level rules” to clarify that he was not advocating a 
contextual approach taken to an extreme—with each case taken entirely on its own facts and 
circumstances. See Wilkins, Legal Realism, supra note 50, at 515–19. Instead, he was proposing 
“a set of ‘middle-level principles’ that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in social 
and institutional context while providing a structural foundation for widespread compliance in 
the areas where they apply.” Id. at 516 (footnote omitted). 
 52. See id. at 515–19. 
 53. See Wilkins, supra note 11, at 1151–59. 
 54. See id. at 1181–82.  
REMUS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:55 PM 
2014] OUT OF PRACTICE 1255 
the level of public obligation should vary with the type of 
engagement. He explained that lawyers need more leeway to 
advocate zealously for clients when litigating than when offering 
advice and guidance in a nonadversarial context.55 
Wilkins acknowledged the difficulty of developing context-
specific rules and enforcement mechanisms. In particular, he noted 
the definitional difficulty of determining which differences mattered 
for what purposes and the jurisdictional difficulty of determining 
which rules applied to what conduct.56 Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, he emphasized the importance of the undertaking for the 
future of the profession. He therefore called for sustained study to 
explore differences between various practice settings.57 
Many scholars answered the call. Some considered the broader 
systemic implications of specialization and fragmentation and 
concluded that the unitary legal profession was a relic. For example, 
Keith Fisher contended that “[t]o talk in the 21st century about ‘the 
legal profession’ is to speak of a nonexistent, monolithic construct 
that is, at best, a holdover of 19th century images of small-town or 
local law practice.”58 Professor John Leubsdorf wrote of the 
“centrifugal movement” that led to the current fragmented profession 
and predicted that the profession would fragment even further.59 
Other scholars explored specific practice settings, including 
large-firm practice, transactional practice, in-house advising, 
government lawyering, and cause lawyering.60 In each context, they 
 
 55. See id. at 1183–84. Wilkins also argued that the implicated legal market was relevant in 
designing and imposing appropriate sanctions. With respect to the Kaye Scholer case, he 
concluded that the Office of Thrift Supervision’s imposition of a temporary order to cease and 
desist was insufficiently sensitive to its fatal impact on a large law firm operating in a highly 
competitive market. See id. at 1214–15. 
 56. See id. at 1216–18 (“[One objection], which I call the spillover critique, argues that 
context-specific rules will inevitably reach beyond their intended scope.”). 
 57. See id. at 1216 (“My purpose here is to spark, rather than to resolve, the debate over 
exactly how context should be incorporated into regulatory policy for thrift lawyers.”). In 2012, 
Wilkins returned to these questions, observing that they are growing increasingly complicated 
“as lawyers, clients, and legal norms increasingly cross established contextual boundaries.” 
Wilkins, supra note 9, at 40. Again, he called for further scholarly attention and research. Id. at 
25. 
 58. Fisher, supra note 10, at 1042. 
 59. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 959, 962 (2009). 
 60. See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation 
of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 
721–23 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost 
of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1714–15 (2008); 
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explored the conditions of lawyers’ work and decisionmaking and 
described current sources of regulation. Many scholars also proposed 
context-specific rules for particular practice specialties, including 
bankruptcy, estate planning, mass torts, securities, and employment.61 
These scholars advanced a segmented model of the legal profession 
that continued to embrace the profession’s mediating role between 
state and society, while breaking free of the traditional model’s 
exclusive focus on litigation. 
C. Problematizing the Models 
Although the segmented model provides important insights into 
ethical tensions that arise from specialization, it shares a fundamental 
flaw with the traditional model. Both models focus narrowly on 
established areas of legal practice, assuming that a static boundary 
exists between legal practice and business practice. As a result, 
neither model accounts for one of the most significant sources of 
change and ethical tension facing the profession today—the 
emergence of a robust but ambiguous boundary zone between law 
and business. Within this zone, an increasing number of licensed 
lawyers engage in hybrid quasi-legal work, which does not fit within 
existing conceptions of legal practice. 
 
David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—The Civil Liability 
of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 
181–207 (2009); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 
S. TEX. L. REV. 549, 562–63 (1998). See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, 
Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Daniel R. Coquillette 
& Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through 
Legislative, Court, and Agency Reform, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011); Fisher, supra note 
10, at 1033–43; Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation To Raise Frivolous Issues in 
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1105 (1995); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010).  
 61. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To Include the 
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); Major Bernard P. 
Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional Conduct for Army Lawyers, 
124 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Peppet, supra note 35; Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: 
The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); 
Stanley Sporkin, Commentary, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the 
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); see STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR 
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (Acad. of Family Mediators 1998), reprinted in CODES OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 554, 554–58 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999) (family and 
divorce mediation); CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n 1977), in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 564, 564–72 
(arbitration). 
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During the latter half of the twentieth century, the organized bar 
both responded to and encouraged the proliferation of quasi-legal 
work through a new approach to minding its jurisdiction.62 Whereas 
bar leaders once sought clarity in defining, defending, and expanding 
the bar’s jurisdiction over new work arising at the boundary between 
law and business, they subsequently came to embrace the ambiguity. 
Early in the twentieth century, the bar insisted on a sharp 
distinction between legal work and other forms of work. Bar 
committees vigorously enforced unauthorized-practice-of-law 
statutes,63 and the bar promulgated codes of conduct that limited 
lawyers’ interactions with nonlawyers.64 Because the vast majority of 
legal work occurred in the courtroom or the law firm office, minding 
the boundaries of the profession was relatively straightforward. In the 
observable and highly regimented setting of courtroom litigation, 
where the bar could prevent imposters from engaging in tasks 
reserved for lawyers with relative ease, it could persuasively defend 
the notion that navigating the intricacies of courtroom procedures 
required special training and expertise. In the less public setting of 
law firms, the bar could limit nonlawyer involvement by prohibiting 
nonlawyer ownership65 and by narrowly prescribing appropriate 
communications between lawyers and the limited number of 
nonlawyers (primarily clients) with whom they interacted.66 
Over the course of the twentieth century, a proliferation of new 
work at the boundary between law and business altered this 
 
 62. The processes through which a discipline or profession attempts to distinguish itself 
from other disciplines or professions and to claim and defend jurisdiction over particular types 
of knowledge and forms of work is referred to by sociologists as “boundary-work.” Professor 
Thomas Gieryn developed the concept to describe efforts by scientists to distinguish their work 
from other intellectual activities. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation 
of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. 
SOC. REV. 781, 781–82 (1983). When boundary work involves attempts by a discipline to expand 
its authority and jurisdiction over other areas of expertise, professionals attempt to distinguish 
their work and knowledge from the work and knowledge of outsiders and to cast outsiders in an 
unfavorable light. See id. at 791–92. See generally THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL 
BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1999). The organized bar has always 
engaged in boundary work, generally by highlighting the specialized nature of legal work, the 
unique competency of lawyers to engage in that work, and the importance of protecting the 
public from incompetent and unethical service providers. See generally PROVINE, supra note 25.  
 63. WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 825; Rhode, supra note 17, at 6–11. 
 64. WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 826. 
 65. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (1937) (“No division of fees for legal services 
is proper, except with another lawyer . . . .”). 
 66. Id.  
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landscape.67 As legal practice and business practice grew together, the 
boundary between the two blurred. Legal knowledge became 
increasingly enmeshed in business concerns, and a new category of 
quasi-legal roles emerged. The bar responded with a new approach to 
policing its boundaries, which both reflected and facilitated these 
trends. It permitted and even embraced ambiguity, allowing the 
question of whether a particular task constituted the practice of law 
to turn on the work setting or job title of the person doing the work. 
The bar expressed this new approach by pushing legal practice 
into new business settings while subsuming new forms of 
transactional work within its jurisdiction. For example, it created 
exceptions to its fee-sharing prohibitions to allow lawyers to practice 
law in not-for-profit corporations, insurance companies, and 
government agencies.68 In these new work settings, lawyers performed 
new kinds of corporate, banking, and regulatory work.69 Lawyers who 
remained in firms began lobbying for their corporate clients and 
representing them before agencies.70 
Through these new forms of work, lawyers came into increasing 
contact with a wider array of nonlawyers—particularly corporate 
actors—outside of the traditional settings of courtrooms and law firm 
offices. This shift blurred the distinction between legal work and 
business work, raising concerns about the reach of professional 
regulations and the strength of professional independence. Corporate 
clients began dictating litigation strategies and participating in other 
activities traditionally characterized as legal practice.71 Corporate 
lawyers, for their part, began participating in business strategy 
decisions from positions in upper management.72 Legal scholars have 
 
 67. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 13; Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business 
Out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1874–81.  
 68. See Green, supra note 22, at 1152–53; Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, 
Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1469, 1510–14 (2000). Today, lawyers may be employed by nonlawyers or retained by a third 
party in a number of circumstances. For example, lawyers may be retained by insurance 
companies to represent policyholders, by social service agencies to represent the agencies’ 
clients, or by the government to represent individuals. Schneyer, supra, at 1507–08. 
 69. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 13; Nelson, supra note 5, at 357.  
 70. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 14–15.  
 71. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 60, at 289–93. 
 72. Id. at 285–93. 
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detailed the ethical problems arising from this trend,73 but the 
organized bar has been slow to address them.74 
Simultaneously, legal knowledge became increasingly relevant to 
existing and new business roles. For example, as the regulatory state 
grew larger and increasingly complex, demand for lobbyists to draft 
and advocate legislation steadily increased.75 In the wake of corporate 
scandals, compliance officers became more prevalent and more 
influential.76 These and other quasi-legal roles increased in number 
and prominence at the boundary of law and business. 
Although laypeople routinely performed, and continue to 
perform, quasi-legal work, increasing numbers of licensed lawyers are 
 
 73. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Ethics of In-House Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 9, at 197, 205–06 (noting that under the 
Model Rules, “[b]usiness matters (even those that might involve immoral but legally permissible 
conduct) are not ‘in the lawyer’s province,’” and that “as such, lawyers may stick to the law and 
questions of legality (especially when dealing with sophisticated clients)”). Other scholars have 
argued for further change, analyzing the benefits of professional collaboration between lawyers 
and non-lawyers, especially in the commercial claim-funding context. See, e.g., Michele 
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2795–96 (2012). 
 74. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as 
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1034 (2005) (“[T]he ABA’s 2003 amendments to the 
Model Rules . . . ignor[e] the situation of inside counsel by not addressing the ethical ecology of 
inside counsel . . . .”).  
 75. Lobbyists engage in a variety of activities, including drafting and interpreting bills, 
preparing and delivering testimony, and recruiting sponsors. The demand for lobbyists 
increased as law and administration became more complex with the rise of the regulatory state. 
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in 
THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5 (William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon 
eds., 4th ed. 2009). Formal legal training and licensure are not required to be a registered 
lobbyist, but they can be highly valuable. 
 76. Compliance officers monitor the activities of a company’s directors, officers, and 
employees to ensure compliance with governing rules and regulations. The visibility and 
prevalence of the role increased dramatically in publicly traded companies in the wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF 
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.04[5] (8th ed. 2013) (“Among other things, the 
[chief governance officer], who is typically a legally trained executive, is responsible for 
compliance with certain governance-related laws . . . .”); Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to 
Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1301 
(2005) (“[Compliance officers] . . . have the potential for making directors accountable for 
corporate legal compliance decisions.”); Harry Hurt III, Drop That Ledger! This Is the 
Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at B5 (“Sarbanes-Oxley has made chief 
compliance officers almost as important to corporate success—or at least survival—as chief 
executives and chief financial officers.”). Registered lobbyists are not required to have formal 
legal training and licensure, but it is advantageous for those that do. 
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now occupying quasi-legal roles.77 They include investment bankers, 
compliance officers, consultants, and accountants; they lead hedge 
funds, banks, private equity firms, and large corporations.78 With the 
collapse in the market for legal services, many young lawyers now 
enter these quasi-legal roles directly from law school.79 
The bar could have responded to these quasi-legal roles as it did 
when lawyers first moved in-house—by working to extend its 
jurisdiction and ethical rules to cover additional work sites, even as it 
tolerated the increasing enmeshment of lawyers in the business 
world.80 Instead, bar leaders declined to act definitively, neither 
bringing quasi-legal work clearly within, nor excluding it clearly from, 
the profession’s jurisdiction. As recently as 2003, an ABA committee 
 
 77. Of the 2011 graduates who were employed as of February 15, 2013, 17.9 percent were 
working in business, and of those jobs, only 29.1 percent were positions for which bar passage 
was required. See Class of 2012 National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT 1 
(July 2013), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NationalSummaryChart2012.pdf. Of the wider sample 
of 2012 graduates whose employment status was known as of February 2013, 22.3 percent were 
working in jobs for which bar passage was not required or preferred; 13.3 percent were working 
in jobs for which legal training was preferred but not required. See id. NALP reported that these 
percentages were the highest it had measured since it began tracking such data in 2001. See 
Employment for the Class of 2012—Selected Findings, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT 1–2 
(2013), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2012SelectedFindings.pdf. NALP statistics for the 
past ten years reveal a steady increase in the number of law graduates who accept jobs for which 
legal training is preferred but not required: 13.3 percent of 2012 graduates; 12.9 percent of 
graduates averaged over the past two years; 10.8 percent of graduates from the past five years; 
and 9.1 percent of graduates from the past ten years. See Recent Graduates, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. 
PLACEMENT, http://www.nalp.org/recentgraduates (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (linking to 
employment statistics of recent graduates for the past ten years).  
 78. The rate at which lawyers have moved out of practice appears to have increased 
considerably. See RENNARD STRICKLAND & FRANK T. READ, THE LAWYER MYTH: A 
DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 6 (2008); Joe G. Baker and Brian K. 
Jorgensen, Leaving the Law: Occupational and Career Mobility of Law School Graduates, 50 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 16, 16 (2000); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
596, 604–07 (2006); see also Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in 
Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1010–
16 (2007) (noting the proliferation of quasi-legal and extralegal roles within large corporations); 
David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 852–55 (1999) (commenting on 
the movement of lawyers out of practice and into business roles); Pater Lattman & Richard 
Perez-Pena, Romney, at Harvard, Merged Two Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A12 
(reporting that “the vast majority of graduates [of Harvard’s joint J.D./M.B.A. program] end up 
in business rather than law”). See generally DEBORAH ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: 
WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETTING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004). 
 79. See Class of 2011 National Summary Report, supra note 6; Employment for the Class of 
2011—Selected Findings, supra note 6.  
 80. Licensure is required to work as in-house counsel, and, although the rules of 
professional conduct remain indexed primarily to litigation, it is clear that they cover the work 
of in-house lawyers. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 35 (1931).  
REMUS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:55 PM 
2014] OUT OF PRACTICE 1261 
failed in its efforts to promulgate a model uniform definition of the 
practice of law.81 The committee observed “an increasing number of 
situations where nonlawyers . . . are providing services that are 
difficult to categorize . . . as being . . . within the definition of the 
practice of law,” and concluded that it would be impossible to offer a 
uniform definition.82 In doing so, the committee effectively blessed 
the ambiguity that surrounds the boundaries of legal practice and the 
status of quasi-legal work. 
Related ambiguity surrounds the coverage of the bar’s ethical 
rules. The ABA purports to bind lawyers to all of the Model Rules, 
which contain provisions for “law-related services” performed in 
conjunction with legal services.83 “Law-related services” are services, 
like accounting and financial planning, that do not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law when performed by nonlawyers but that 
often relate to the provision of legal services.84 By implication, lawyers 
who offer law-related services without also engaging in the practice of 
law are not bound by the provisions of the Model Rules. Most, but 
 
 81. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_328.authcheckdam.pdf. ABA guidance 
is not binding unless states adopt it, but the ABA’s efforts with respect to professional 
regulation serve as important reference points regarding the approach of the country’s bar writ 
large. Here, they evidence the bar’s growing ambivalence toward the scope of practice and the 
coverage of the rules of professional conduct.  
 82. Id. at 13. Early in its work, the committee circulated a draft definition “with the goal of 
stimulating discussion.” See id. at 3. It defined the practice of law as “the application of legal 
principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person that require 
the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.” Task Force on the Model Definition of 
the Practice of Law: Definition of the Practice of Law Draft, A.B.A. (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/
model_definition_definition.html. It then listed four activities that presumptively fell within this 
definition:  
(1) Giving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities or to 
those of others;  
(2) Selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents or agreements that affect the 
legal rights of a person;  
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body, including, but not limited to, 
preparing or filing documents or conducting discovery; or  
(4) Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a person. 
Id. It later abandoned this definition, however, after observing too much variation regarding the 
practice of law as among the states. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION 
OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 81, at 4.  
 83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2013). 
 84. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 678 (1996) (concluding 
that divorce mediation constitutes a “lawyer’s services”). 
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not all, states adopted this approach.85 In practice, it generally 
exempts licensed lawyers working in quasi-legal roles from being 
regulated as lawyers (unless they are simultaneously practicing law). 
Notwithstanding its apparent reticence to address quasi-legal 
work, the Model Rules also envision application of certain broad 
prohibitions to all licensed lawyers, practicing or not. For example, 
under Model Rules 8.3 and 8.4, it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects,” “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation,” “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,”86 or fail to report a violation of the 
professional rules by another lawyer.87 These provisions purport to 
bind all licensed lawyers, practicing or not.88 ABA Formal Opinion 
04-433 goes a step further, purporting to bind all licensed lawyers to 
all provisions of the Model Rules.89 
States have declined to adopt and implement these approaches, 
however. State supreme courts delegate their regulatory authority to 
state bars,90 which generally do not concern themselves with the 
 
 85. See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE 
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING 
LAW-RELATED SERVICES (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/cpr/pic/5_7.authcheckdam.pdf (noting whether each state has adopted Rule 5.7 
and, if so, in what form). 
 86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RR. 8.4(b)–(d).  
 87. Id. R. 8.3. 
 88. See, e.g., id. R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. pmbl., para. 3 (citing Rule 8.4 in noting that “there are Rules that apply to 
lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are 
acting in a nonprofessional capacity”). 
 89. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 (2004) (“‘[A] 
lawyer must comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility whether or not he is acting in his professional capacity.’” (quoting ABA Comm. 
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974))).  
 90. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-31 (2004) (“The license to practice law in this 
state is a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted 
with professional and judicial matters, and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney 
and as an officer of the court. It is the duty of every recipient of that privilege to conduct himself 
at all times, both professionally and personally, in conformity with the standards imposed upon 
members of the bar as conditions for the privilege to practice law.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 
117, 123–24 (1961) (describing courts’ traditional power to discipline members of the bar, 
incident to a “broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and the standards 
of professional conduct unsullied”); Redball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 908 F. 
Supp. 1226, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A trial judge has the inherent authority to regulate lawyers’ 
professional conduct.”); In re Integration of Bar of Haw., 432 P.2d 887, 888 (Haw. 1967) 
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conduct and activities of nonpracticing lawyers.91 Insofar as the ABA 
has exhibited ambivalence regarding quasi-legal work, state bar 
disciplinary committees have not—they view such work as outside the 
scope of professional regulation. On the ground, therefore, licensed 
lawyers working in business roles do so free from the strictures of 
professional regulation. 
Scholars and regulators have given insufficient attention to the 
existence and ethical significance of quasi-legal roles, likely because 
of the existing models that inform their work. Both the traditional 
and segmented models focus narrowly and exclusively on the practice 
of law, and fail to recognize and account for other, increasingly 
significant forms of lawyers’ work. But neither scholars nor regulators 
can continue to ignore the quasi-legal work of licensed lawyers. As I 
argue in the next Part, quasi-legal work is the source of significant 
ethical tensions that pose imminent threats of harm to clients, the 
public, and the independence of the legal profession. 
II.  THE ETHICAL AMBIGUITY OF QUASI-LEGAL WORK 
When licensed lawyers perform quasi-legal work, a number of 
dangers arise. In this Part, I highlight three of these dangers: lawyers 
may take advantage of consumer confusion and leverage their law 
licenses to their own advantage; lawyers may evade ethical 
obligations by transitioning into and out of practice; and sophisticated 
corporate actors may engage in ethical arbitrage by relying on lawyers 
in different roles subject to different obligations for different 
purposes. I argue that the cumulative effect of the ambiguity 
surrounding quasi-legal work undermines the profession’s mediating 
 
(discussing “the inherent power lodged in the courts . . . with respect to matters affecting the bar 
and the practice of law”); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 22–33 (discussing state and 
federal courts’ inherent authority to regulate lawyers in all capacities); Charles W. Wolfram, 
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1989) (discussing courts’ inherent power to regulate lawyers). 
 91. Notwithstanding two exceedingly high-profile examples—Presidents Bill Clinton and 
Richard Nixon, both of whom were disbarred—state bars have rarely attempted to regulate 
licensed lawyers who were not practicing law or engaging in law-related services. Exceptions 
generally entail egregious conduct. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Lazerow, 
578 A.2d 779, 779 (Md. 1990) (disbarring a real estate developer after he misappropriated 
$200,000 of clients’ escrow funds); In re Discipline of Janklow, 709 N.W.2d 28, 30 (S.D. 2006) 
(observing that, among other things, Janklow had been convicted of second-degree 
manslaughter); In re Discipline of Hopp, 376 N.W.2d 816, 816 (S.D. 1985) (suspending the 
license of an inactive lawyer who was self-employed in the laundry and dry cleaning industry for 
convictions related to cocaine use). 
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role between state and society, and threatens to shift the profession’s 
orientation away from the public and the state and toward private 
corporate interests. 
A. Consumer Confusion 
The first category of ethical tension surrounding lawyers’ quasi-
legal work is the likelihood of consumer confusion arising among 
business customers with whom these lawyers interact. Because the 
profession effectively exempts lawyers working in quasi-legal roles 
from professional regulation,92 the nature and extent of these lawyers’ 
ethical obligations are unclear. This ambiguity can confuse 
consumers, who may incorrectly assume that because these 
individuals are licensed lawyers, they owe professional duties of 
confidentiality, loyalty, and care to all consumers. Lawyers and the 
businesses that employ them can leverage this confusion to their own 
advantage. 
The risks are well illustrated by the example of trust officers—a 
role for which legal training and licensure are advantageous but not 
required.93 Trust officers engage in work that, in some respects, 
resembles the work of an estate-planning attorney. They advise 
clients on the use of trusts, draft trust instruments, and administer and 
manage trust accounts. In other respects, however, trust officers’ 
work resembles banking work, as they routinely market and sell their 
employers’ products and services. For a number of reasons, licensed 
and practicing lawyers are particularly attractive applicants for trust-
officer positions. Previous experience as a practitioner signals to an 
employer that the applicant is already familiar with reading and 
drafting trust agreements and with the tax consequences of certain 
arrangements. It signals to actual and potential clients that the bank’s 
funds are in the hands of individuals with the knowledge and 
experience to administer the trusts wisely.94 For these reasons, banks 
often recruit junior associates at law firms to serve as trust officers.95 
 
 92. See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Marshall L. Zissman, Potential Liability of Corporate Fiduciaries for Estate 
Planning Errors, TR. & EST., June 1985, 28, 28–29 (summarizing the functions of trust officers). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515, 
521–22 (1996) (“Banks and insurance companies hire lawyers for estate planning and 
administration . . . .”); see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary 
Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of 
Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 105 (2000) (“[I]nvestment 
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When contacted by bank employees about complicated matters 
involving legal instruments and issues, clients who know that the 
employees are lawyers may think that these lawyers owe lawyerly 
duties of loyalty and competency in performing their work. Clients 
may reasonably believe, for example, that trust officers who are 
lawyers will only market a bank’s estate-planning products and 
services that are in the clients’ best interests. The bar’s rules of 
professional conduct do not govern trust officers, however, and state 
regulations regarding trust officers’ duties to clients vary 
significantly.96 In some situations, they may owe fiduciary duties—for 
example, after offering financial and investment advice and 
establishing a formal business relationship.97 But in other situations, 
fiduciary duties will not attach98—for example, when a trust officer 
initially contacts a potential client to market a product or service. 
Moreover, when banks market their products and services nationwide 
from a variety of different locations, there may be significant 
uncertainty as to which jurisdiction’s rules apply. 
Amidst this complexity and ambiguity, consumer confusion and 
harm are real risks. Without independent legal counsel, even 
relatively sophisticated individuals will struggle to sort through the 
relevant law and determine the role and duties of a particular lawyer-
trust officer. Even worse, the resulting confusion may allow both trust 
officers and their employing banks or trust companies to leverage 
trust officers’ law licenses to increase corporate sales. This 
manipulation can then reflect back on and undermine the legitimacy 
of the legal profession. 
B. Transitions into and Out of Practice 
Opportunities for abuse increase when lawyers transition 
between practice roles and quasi-legal roles. Scholars have observed 
 
banking firms seem to be hiring many lawyers who offer services to clients in the non-law firm 
setting.”). 
 96. See Ruth Plato-Shinar & Rolf H. Weber, Three Models of the Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, 2 
L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 422, 423–25 (2008). 
 97. Id. at 423.  
 98. Annotation, Existence of Fiduciary Relationship Between Bank and Depositor or 
Customer so as To Impose Special Duty of Disclosure upon Bank, 70 A.L.R.3d 1344, § 2 (1976 & 
Supp. 2013).  
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the increasing mobility that characterizes today’s profession.99 
Overwhelmingly, the scholarship focuses on lawyers’ transitions 
among law firms or other traditional practice settings.100 Equally 
significant but overlooked are lawyers’ transitions into and out of 
legal practice and quasi-legal roles. As legal expertise becomes 
increasingly valuable to a range of businesses and employers, lawyers 
acquire enhanced flexibility to move between legal practice and 
business practice. They are now doing so with increasing frequency.101 
The profession’s regulatory structures do not adequately address 
the resulting ethical tensions. Through conflict-of-interest provisions, 
the Model Rules address transitions among traditional practice 
settings,102 including the special situation of a government lawyer who 
transitions into private practice.103 They offer limited guidance, 
however, regarding transitions to and from quasi-legal roles. They 
address these transitions only indirectly, through broadly applicable 
confidentiality and conflict-of-interest provisions. Model Rule 1.6 
prohibits disclosure of confidential information,104 and Model Rule 1.9 
prohibits use of confidential information gained in a former 
representation to the detriment of a former client.105 These narrow 
provisions leave room for abuse in the context of quasi-legal work, 
where lawyers have no current clients, only former clients. A former 
client will face great difficulty in establishing that the lawyer used 
information gained during a former representation without disclosing 
 
 99. PAULA A. PATTON, THE NALP FOUND., TOWARD EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
ASSOCIATE MOBILITY: A STATUS REPORT ON ATTRITION 10 (2005); see supra notes 78–79 and 
accompanying text.  
 100. See Heineman, supra note 78, at 604–07 (noting the mobility of lawyers from one career 
to the next); Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between 
Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 
199 (2007) (noting the mobility of lawyers among traditional areas of practice).  
 101. See generally ARRON, supra note 78; Baker & Jorgensen, supra note 78. 
 102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013) (addressing transitions between 
concurrent representations); id. R. 1.9 (addressing transitions between successive 
representations). But see generally Wald, supra note 100 (contending there is unresolved tension 
between confidentiality protections and conflicts rules). 
 103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11. To ensure that government lawyers 
do not exploit their previous government positions to the advantage of a subsequent client, this 
rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in a matter in which she personally 
participated while working for the government unless the associated government agency grants 
permission. See id. (disqualifying the lawyer’s new firm also from representing the client on that 
matter unless the lawyer does not participate in the representation and does not receive any fee 
from the representation). 
 104. Id. R. 1.6. 
 105. Id. R. 1.9(c)(1). 
REMUS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:55 PM 
2014] OUT OF PRACTICE 1267 
it and without authorization.106 Moreover, these provisions do not 
prohibit a lawyer from using the information in ways that benefit the 
lawyer without directly harming the former client—permitting, for 
example, the use of information about an adversary that has no 
relevance for the former client. This regulatory gap permits lawyers 
to leverage insider information to their advantage as they transition 
through roles. 
A recent federal litigation development illustrates the risk of 
harm that can result from such information asymmetries. John 
Desmarais left his partnership at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in 
2010 and opened a patent-licensing company called Round Rock 
Research (Round Rock).107 Patent-licensing companies—pejoratively 
known as “patent trolls”—represent an entire business model arising 
from the quasi-legal zone. These companies typically evaluate and 
purchase patents they believe to underpin rapidly developing 
technological platforms. They neither perform scientific or 
technological research nor commercialize products.108 Instead, they 
simply enforce their patents against alleged infringers. Because of the 
benefit of legal-practice experience in understanding which patents 
have value and are likely to be upheld, lawyers have moved into, and 
sometimes become principals of, many patent-licensing firms. John 
Desmarais, however, was not content simply to move out of practice. 
Concurrent with the founding of Round Rock, he also started a small 
law firm, Desmarais LLP, to negotiate Round Rock’s licenses and to 
litigate its infringement suits.109 
In 2011, after Round Rock sued Dell Inc. for infringement of a 
number of patents, Dell moved to disqualify Desmarais LLP on the 
grounds that the law firm could use Dell’s “Confidential—Attorney’s 
Eyes Only” information to advance Round Rock’s business 
position.110 More specifically, Dell alleged that Desmarais could 
acquire information as a practicing lawyer at Desmarais LLP that he 
 
 106. Former clients often have trouble satisfying the burden of production required upon 
moving for disqualification. See, e.g., O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 19 A.3d 
966, 978 (N.J. 2011) (denying a motion for disqualification where a former client’s claims that 
“information ‘concerning pending litigation and business matters’ had been disclosed” to an 
attorney were “vague[]”). 
 107. See Jan Wolfe, Round Rock Business Model Comes Under Attack from Dell, CORP. 
COUNS. (May 31, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202556654749. 
 108. See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–4, 43 n.269 (2013) 
(discussing characteristics of “patent trolls”). 
 109. Wolfe, supra note 107. 
 110. Id. 
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could then exploit in his role as chief executive officer of an allegedly 
independent business.111 In its motion to disqualify, Dell wrote: “Mr. 
Desmarais himself has shown that the risk of such cross-over is very 
real, having at least once already provided to Round Rock reverse 
engineering information obtained from one client—while wearing his 
‘Desmarais LLP’ hat—in order to facilitate Round Rock’s licensing 
effort against another target.”112 Dell’s counsel elaborated at oral 
argument: based on information gained from conversations with an 
opponent in his capacity as a lawyer at Desmarais LLP, Desmarais 
broadened the scope of pending patent applications held by Round 
Rock.113 In response, Desmarais agreed to a protective order 
screening him from the case and precluding him from working on 
associated patent applications in the future.114 Dell’s counsel was not 
satisfied, arguing that the risks to Dell were grounds for disqualifying 
the entire firm from the representation.115 A Texas district judge 
denied the request,116 and the Federal Circuit denied the petition for a 
writ of mandamus that Dell subsequently filed.117 
Desmarais’s alleged conduct seems flatly inconsistent with the 
professional ideals that justify lawyers’ monopoly power. Desmarais 
allegedly leveraged information that he gained in a traditional 
practice role (as a partner at Desmarais LLP) to his own advantage in 
a quasi-legal role (as chief executive officer of Round Rock). And 
yet, the profession’s system of regulation neither prohibits nor deters 
his conduct.118  
Desmarais neither disclosed confidential information nor used 
information gained during a representation to harm a former client. It 
is therefore unlikely that he would be subject to professional 
discipline by the bar. Moreover, Dell’s resort to a writ of mandamus, 
 
 111. See Round Rock Research, LLC v. Dell Inc., No. 4:11-CV-332, 2012 WL 1848672, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2011). 
 112. Wolfe, supra note 107.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Round Rock Research, 2012 WL 1848672, at *3. 
 116. Id. at *4. 
 117. In re Dell Inc., 498 F. App’x 40, 44 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 118. As discussed above, see supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text, the Model Rules 
comprehensively address transitions among traditional practice settings and into and out of 
government service. They offer limited guidance, however, regarding transitions to and from 
nontraditional and quasi-legal roles, such as the business role at issue here. They do not speak to 
the situation of a lawyer like Desmarais, who is concurrently practicing law at a law firm and 
occupying a leadership role of a company that the law firm represents.  
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a last-stop procedural device, reveals the reluctance of courts to 
intervene to address and deter this type of conduct. Ambiguity 
continues to surround these transitions, allowing lawyers like 
Desmarais to engage in conduct that, although not technically 
prohibited by the rules, is clearly improper—using information gained 
in practice for personal gain outside of practice. 
C. Ethical Arbitrage 
In addition to permitting lawyers to evade professional 
regulation, the ethical ambiguity surrounding quasi-legal roles 
enables sophisticated corporate actors to engage in troubling forms of 
gamesmanship. Corporate actors can manipulate the coverage of the 
professional rules to their advantage, relying on lawyers in different 
roles for different purposes. In this way, they can manage risk and 
liability and access legal expertise subject to as few constraints as 
possible. 
Corporate management has long engaged in a limited form of 
this strategy by selectively relying on in-house counsel for some work 
and outside counsel for other work.119 For example, corporate 
management may rely on in-house lawyers, who are embedded within 
the corporate structure and culture, for legal advice on formulating 
business plans and legal strategies. Although they may need outside 
counsel to provide third-party opinions that vouch for the legality of 
their business plans, they can rely on in-house counsel to determine 
the minimal information necessary to disclose to outside counsel to 
receive a favorable opinion letter.120 By relying on a source of legal 
advice that is not fully independent and a source of independent 
evaluation that is not fully informed, sophisticated corporate actors 
can co-opt lawyers into facilitating desired business strategies. Often, 
they also acquire important defenses and limitations of liability in the 
process. 
The proliferation of quasi-legal roles allows corporate 
management to expand its strategic access to legal expertise under a 
 
 119. See Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who 
Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out,” Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 897, 928 (2003) (“Although companies rely on in-house counsel for some functions, they 
look to outside counsel in transactions where third-party verification is needed . . . .”); see also 
Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 
17–21 (2002) (describing the different roles of Enron’s in-house and outside counsel during the 
company’s accounting scandal). 
 120. See Hurt, supra note 119, at 928. 
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greater range of conditions and subject to fewer constraints. For 
example, management could hire a licensed but nonpracticing lawyer 
to serve as a compliance officer. Compliance officers monitor the 
activities of a company’s directors, officers, and employees to ensure 
compliance with governing rules and regulations. Although the role is 
not new, its visibility and prevalence in publicly traded companies 
increased dramatically in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002121 (Sarbanes-Oxley).122 Compliance officer positions do not 
require specific credentials, but a law license—signaling legal 
knowledge and experience—can be highly valuable in the hiring 
process. In some companies, including many smaller companies, a 
single individual may serve as both general counsel and chief 
compliance officer.123 In many other companies, however, the 
compliance function is located outside of, and walled off from, the 
functions of the general counsel’s office.124 
If compliance officers are located outside of the general counsel’s 
office, management derives the benefits of a lawyer’s expertise and 
reputational capital in the compliance role while ceding far less 
control than if the lawyer-compliance officer was subject to 
professional regulation.125 In contrast to the clear principle that a 
corporate lawyer’s loyalty runs to the company as an entity, a 
compliance officer has vague duties and loyalties.126 In practice, her 
loyalty and reporting obligations likely run to direct superiors in 
corporate management.127 And, because a compliance officer is not 
 
 121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  
 122. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 76, § 1.04[5]; Hurt, supra note 76. 
 123. See Hurt, supra note 76. 
 124. See Rosen, supra note 76, at 1307. For a criticism of this trend toward 
departmentalization, see Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why 
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 154–67 (2014). 
 125. Compliance officers are neither bound by the obligations of the legal profession nor 
regulated by any other professional or disciplinary body. Pietro M. deVolpi, Jr., Protocols for 
the Chief Governance Officer, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 59, 78–80 (2009).  
 126. See Amy H. Hutchens, Wearing Two Hats: The Dual Roles of In-House Counsel and 
Compliance Officer, CONT. MGMT., Feb. 2012, at 18, 21–24 (discussing conflicts between 
statutory reporting duties and professional duties of loyalty and confidence). 
 127. See deVolpi, supra note 125, at 85 (indicating that general counsel and board members 
review a Chief Governance Officer’s performance); see also MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, 
DIRECTORS AS GUARDIANS OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL: 
WHAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW 23 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF277.pdf (recognizing that a 
compliance officer reporting directly to the board could create a “mutually enabling 
relationship”); Ben Heineman, Don’t Divorce the GC and Compliance Officer, HARVARD L. 
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subject to the rules of professional conduct, she is free from 
affirmative duties to report corporate wrongdoing up the ladder to 
the board of directors.128 Given case law suggesting that compliance 
officers can be terminated at will,129 she will move beyond her 
immediate superior at her own peril. Accordingly, management can 
hold the lawyer-compliance officer out to the board and to 
shareholders as evidence that it is working proactively to incorporate 
legal expertise in all decisionmaking and auditing processes. But it 
need not worry—at least not to the extent it might worry with in-
house counsel—that the lawyer-compliance officer will report 
corporate wrongdoing up the ladder to the board. 
In addition, a compliance officer can engage in conduct in which 
in-house or outside counsel cannot engage but that could be helpful 
to corporate management. For example, she can interview corporate 
employees and other constituents without disclosing that she 
represents the organization and without advising them to secure 
separate counsel.130 She can also communicate directly with 
employees and third parties who have secured separate counsel,131 and 
she need not refrain from giving an impression of disinterestedness to 
parties who are unrepresented.132 
In this way, corporate actors can arbitrage the gaps and 
ambiguities left by the failure of the current regulatory regime to 
 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 26, 2010, 9:53 AM), https://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/12/26/don%E2%80%99t-divorce-the-gc-and-compliance-
officer (citing “lack of independence” as one of the problems that results from the relationship 
between the CFO and supervisor CEO). 
 128. In-house counsel has a duty under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13 
to report corporate misconduct and wrongdoing up the ladder and eventually to the board of 
directors. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.13(b) (2013).  
 129. See Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 761 (N.Y. 2012) (upholding the firing of a 
compliance officer who confronted a company’s chief executive officer with evidence of his 
insider trading). Although the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley purport to offer 
protection, see 5 U.S.C. § 1221, they have frequently failed to do so in any meaningful way, see 
Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a 
Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 860–61 (2007) (arguing that “the convergence of 
the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out for a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower” 
will, in practice, “leave the whistleblower largely unprotected”). 
 130. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (recommending that lawyers 
clarify that they represent the corporation and that the constituent may seek independent 
counsel). 
 131. Cf. id. R. 4.2 (requiring a lawyer to communicate only with the lawyer of a represented 
individual). 
 132. Cf. id. R. 4.3 (requiring a lawyer to refrain from giving an impression of 
disinterestedness when interacting with an unrepresented party). 
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address quasi-legal roles at the boundary of law and business. 
Corporations can gather significant information while parting with 
minimal control over that information, and they can access legal 
expertise that is beholden to them, rather than to corporate boards or 
shareholders. All too often, corporate actors do so in furtherance of 
excessively aggressive, profit-driven strategies. 
When sophisticated corporate actors engage in this form of 
ethical arbitrage, they derive a disproportionate share of the benefits 
from the legal profession’s monopoly while bearing only a portion of 
the corresponding burdens. Certainly, corporate clients bear their 
share of the most recognizable burdens of the profession’s 
monopoly—namely, the rents that inflate the cost of legal services.133 
But additional burdens from the profession’s monopoly extend 
beyond these rents and are borne by other individuals and groups 
throughout society. Most notably, they are borne by the large and 
growing portion of the population who cannot afford legal services. 
Even the lowest-cost legal services, generally found within the 
profession’s personal-plight hemisphere, price many individuals out 
of the market.134 
As the profession uses its market power in ways that entrench 
existing power disparities, low- and middle-income individuals and 
less powerful segments of society also bear the burdens of the 
profession’s monopoly. Frequently, legal interactions involve 
sophisticated corporate actors on one side and individuals and small 
businesses on the other. This is often the case when ordinary 
individuals enter into service, property, insurance, and employment 
contracts. To the extent that the profession is used to the advantage 
of corporate actors and at the expense of individuals, it exacerbates 
the structural inequalities and problems of collective action that 
already characterize these interactions.135 
Finally, society at large bears the costs of the profession’s 
monopoly as corporate actors co-opt lawyers into facilitating 
excessively aggressive strategies. Lawyers become, at best, pawns in 
morally ambiguous corporate strategies, and, at worst, agents of 
 
 133. Although a very real cost, monopoly rents are a feature and not a flaw in the system, 
which, ideally, ensures high standards of competency and behavior among lawyers. 
 134. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 323 
(1998).  
 135. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the advantages that repeat 
players in the legal system have over occasional participants). 
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corporate malfeasance. As one corporate scandal after another comes 
to light,136 the legal profession’s failure to serve the public and the 
state by curbing law-breaking behavior becomes more acute.137 This 
trend may foretell the emergence of a new, less prestigious, and likely 
less lucrative sphere of corporate work; it may also demonstrate how 
an overwhelming orientation toward corporate interests has eclipsed 
lawyers’ tripartite duties to clients, the state, and the public. 
III.  THE PATH AHEAD 
The ethical tensions surrounding the work of licensed lawyers in 
the quasi-legal zone threaten harm to clients, the profession, and the 
public at large. In this final Part, I ask how we can most effectively 
address these tensions. I argue that role-based regulation by 
corporations or trade organizations would exacerbate the problems 
discussed above, whereas carefully tailored mechanisms of 
professional regulation could successfully address such problems. 
Critical to the path ahead will be acknowledging the inadequacies of 
current forms of professional regulation based on existing models of 
the profession. The evolving legal landscape requires new forms of 
professional regulation, grounded in an empirical understanding of 
lawyers’ work and ethical orientations within the quasi-legal zone. 
A. The Disadvantages of Role-Based Business Regulation 
Industries, trade groups, and/or businesses could adopt ethical 
rules to govern individuals working in particular quasi-legal roles—
lawyers and nonlawyers alike. These rules could aim to improve these 
 
 136. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and 
Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1 (reporting on the trial of Enron’s chief 
executives); Ken Belson, Adelphia Proposes To Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, 
at C2 (discussing Adelphia’s proposal to settle its cases with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Department of Justice); Corporate America’s Woes, Continued, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 30, 2002, at 59, 60 (discussing the aftereffects of the Enron scandal on regulations); Simon 
Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A1 (reporting on WorldCom’s admission that it overstated its 
cash flow by over $3.8 billion); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Tyco Admits Using 
Accounting Tricks To Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1 (reporting on Tyco 
International’s admission that it inflated its earnings). 
 137. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, Lawyer To Serve Six-and-a-Half Years in KPMG Tax Fraud Case, 
AMLAW DAILY (Apr. 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/
kpmg-lawyer.html (describing the sentence for the lawyer who wrote approximately six hundred 
letters over more than a decade endorsing the tax shelters that KPMG created). See generally 
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2005) (explaining how 
Enron transactions demonstrate the need for judgment in ambiguous ethical situations). 
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individuals’ ethical standards and to address consumer confusion. 
They could, for example, articulate appropriate standards of conduct 
for all trust officers or all compliance officers. Alone, however, 
externally imposed role-based regulation will not resolve, and will 
likely exacerbate, the waning independence of lawyers working in 
quasi-legal roles. 
As an initial matter, regulation by an industry, trade group, or 
business would necessarily be controlled by, and beholden to, the 
regulated group. Accordingly, as quasi-legal roles proliferate and 
licensed lawyers constitute a greater percentage of the quasi-legal 
workforce, this type of regulation could initiate a significant cession 
of the legal profession’s self-regulatory authority and could further 
yield control over lawyers to corporate interests. Moreover, although 
new role-based regulations might guard against abuse by individuals 
occupying particular quasi-legal roles, they would not prevent 
corporate management from continuing to leverage the varying 
ethical obligations that attach to lawyers in different roles. 
Exclusive reliance on external role-based regulation could also 
undermine the checks and balances provided by the profession’s 
system of licensure. Lawyers working in regulated quasi-legal roles 
could retain their law licenses even in cases of blatant misconduct, 
and the threat of disbarment would no longer deter ethical breaches. 
This shift would not only eliminate a powerful incentive for lawyers 
to avoid extreme misconduct, but also potentially dilute the signaling 
and credentialing power of a law license.138 
Indirect regulation through quasi-legal lawyers’ corporate 
employers would be similarly problematic. Empirical research reveals 
a shift in the allocation of authority within corporate attorney-client 
relationships.139 Increasingly, corporate clients take a more dominant 
 
 138. Notwithstanding lawyers’ bad reputations in many sectors of contemporary society, a 
license to practice law continues to signal training, competence, and core ethical commitments. 
If lawyers could retain their law licenses even while violating the codes of conduct for the quasi-
legal roles in which they were working, licensure would lose its signaling power. 
 139. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 60, at 277 (“A striking development in the legal 
profession over the last decade has been the rapid growth in both importance and size of in-
house, or corporate, counsel.”); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional 
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
526–27 (1985) (concluding on the basis of an empirical study of Chicago lawyers that corporate 
lawyers “show such a strong identification with the interests of clients . . . that it is unrealistic to 
think of corporate lawyers as neutral professionals who are detached from the substantive 
interests of their clients”); see also Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 958–60 (2005) (“By the 1970s, the general counsel’s position in many 
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role in determining legal strategy, whereas corporate lawyers, seeking 
to please their clients, view their function as facilitating innovative 
and sometimes aggressive business strategies.140 In light of this shift, 
entrusting corporate clients with the task of regulating their lawyer-
employees holds little promise. Corporate clients would be more 
likely to manage and manipulate regulation than to check their 
lawyer-employees’ client-focused orientation by encouraging strong 
loyalty to the state and the public. Motivated principally by the 
entity’s bottom line, corporate clients’ decisionmaking processes 
would frequently turn on whether the profits of noncompliance 
outstrip the burdens of censure or bad public relations. 
Finally, role-based regulation would replicate a fundamental 
weakness of the segmented model’s prescription for context-specific 
regulation. In both cases, it is impossible to keep pace with all the 
new roles that lawyers occupy and the work that they perform. 
Accordingly, although efforts to regulate particular quasi-legal roles 
may be part of an answer, they cannot be the only answer. 
B. The Advantages of Professional Regulation 
As a means of conditioning and constraining lawyers’ conduct in 
quasi-legal roles, self-imposed professional regulation holds many 
advantages over externally imposed business regulation. The 
fundamental purpose of professional regulation—ensuring a strong 
and independent profession—holds particular force when the central 
problem is the growing power and influence of sophisticated 
corporate clients. Codes of conduct are typically viewed as means of 
constraining undesirable behavior, but they can play an equally 
important role in empowering independent and principled behavior. 
They stand as a powerful justification for lawyers to exercise their 
independent judgment, not only (or necessarily) because they want 
to, but also because they may otherwise lose their license. In addition, 
 
large corporations grew in stature and scope of responsibility. . . . General counsel joined senior 
management near or at the top of the corporate hierarchy.”).  
 140. Research confirms that many corporate lawyers increasingly view themselves primarily 
as innovators and facilitators, tasked with enabling and effectuating business goals by, for 
example, helping to structure beneficial transactions, providing comfort letters as evidence that 
corporate actors acted in good faith, and shielding information from discovery through 
attorney-client privilege. For a perspective of in-house counsel as value creators, see generally 
Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House 
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011). See also Dezalay, supra note 45, at 279–93 
(describing business lawyers as “legal entrepreneurs”); Powell, supra note 45, at 423 (same).  
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insulating the adjudication structures of professional regulation from 
client control helps to ensure that professional norms, rather than 
business or other norms, drive disciplinary decisions. 
Professional regulation can also be used in unique and, thus far, 
unexplored ways to influence corporate clients from within. As noted 
above, a troubling implication of the move of lawyers out of law firms 
and into the business sector is a shift in authority from lawyers to the 
clients and businesses for which they work. But this move also creates 
new opportunities for lawyers to shape their clients’ culture and 
decisionmaking from within. Empirical research supports the notion 
that lawyers can and sometimes do constrain imprudent or illegal 
business strategies by, for example, advising conservative approaches 
to risk tolerance and insisting on proper disclosure.141 Effective 
professional regulation mechanisms can encourage this remedial 
orientation by valuing and empowering independent professional 
judgment. By requiring lawyers to act in certain ways and offering 
them a measure of protection if and when they do, professional 
regulation empowers lawyers to check aggressive business strategies 
and to influence the decisionmaking processes of the organizations 
for which they work. 
Opponents may argue that it is inequitable to impose higher 
standards on lawyers than nonlawyers in the same quasi-legal role. 
This argument ignores the benefits that lawyers derive from their 
licenses, even outside of traditional practice settings. In addition to 
reputational benefits that flow to licensed lawyers through their 
formal connection with the profession, the license also grants lawyers 
the flexibility to transition into and out of practice roles at will. To 
ensure that lawyers and their corporate employers do not trade 
inappropriately on law licenses—and, in doing so, to protect the 
profession’s legitimacy and independence—the benefits of licensure 
must be accompanied by the obligations of professional regulation. 
Moreover, because the license establishes a formal connection 
between a lawyer and the bar, licensed lawyers’ conduct reflects back 
onto the entire profession’s legitimacy, regardless of whether the 
 
 141. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 468 
(2000) (describing the authors’ interviews with corporate counsel aimed at determining how 
frequently these lawyers function in a restraining, as opposed to enabling, role); Christine E. 
Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional 
Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 207–14 (2009) 
(noting that lawyers often act as compliance monitors). 
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attorney practices law. When lawyers in quasi-legal roles engage in 
misconduct, the public’s trust in all lawyers diminishes, and without 
the public’s trust, lawyers cannot fulfill their roles as mediators 
between state and society. 
C. Moving Beyond Existing Models 
Although professional regulation holds great potential as a 
means of addressing ethical tensions in the quasi-legal zone, existing 
forms of regulation are inadequate to achieve this potential. As 
discussed in Part I, the existing regime is based on the traditional 
unitary model of the legal profession and is therefore overwhelmingly 
directed toward litigation.142 Proponents of the segmented model 
persuasively show this regime’s inadequacies and inability to address 
new areas of legal practice. 
Significantly, however, even a regulatory regime based on the 
segmented model that seeks to tailor the fundamentals of legal ethics 
to particular quasi-legal roles would be inadequate. Hybridized quasi-
legal work rarely fits neatly under the rubric of legal practice. The 
fundamentals of legal practice, which include a lawyer’s duties of 
loyalty, confidentiality, and care to clients, are generally inapposite to 
the context of quasi-legal work, which lacks a client and an attorney-
client relationship to anchor and guide lawyers’ duties and 
orientation. Indeed, many ethical tensions surrounding quasi-legal 
work arise from confusion regarding the absence of a client to whom 
the lawyer owes duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and care. The 
profession therefore needs to move beyond existing approaches and 
models and to explore new forms of professional regulation. 
As an essential first step, the profession should commission 
sustained empirical studies to better understand the nature and 
challenges of quasi-legal work. Because existing scholarly models 
ignore this area of work, we know very little about the roles, pay 
levels, backgrounds, and ethical decisionmaking processes of lawyers 
engaged in it. We also know very little about the ethical training and 
socialization of the growing number of lawyers who begin their 
careers in quasi-legal roles rather than in law firms or other 
traditional practice contexts. Empirical research will provide an 
essential first step for designing an appropriate and effective 
regulatory response. 
 
 142. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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Scholarship on the roles and activities of in-house counsel can 
guide us in developing frameworks through which to approach this 
regulatory task. Early empirical work tended to view in-house counsel 
as either acting as a brake on aggressive strategies—what Professors 
Robert Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen call the “cop” role—or as 
promoting gamesmanship to facilitate aggressive strategies—what 
Nelson and Nielson call the “entrepreneur” role.143 Subsequently, 
commentators began building a more nuanced picture of the roles, 
work, and influence of in-house counsel. They asked, for example, 
when and under what circumstances in-house counsel take on 
different roles and orientations toward management and risk.144 We 
should work toward a similarly nuanced understanding of lawyers in 
quasi-legal roles to understand the profession’s shifting contours and 
to lay the groundwork for more effective regulation. 
Concurrently, the profession should use what we do know about 
these roles to begin addressing and managing the ethical ambiguity 
that pervades the quasi-legal zone. As a first step, the profession 
should reexamine its current formulation of the “practice of law.” 
Many lawyers in quasi-legal roles engage in work that, when 
performed by a lawyer in a different setting, is characterized and 
regulated as legal practice. In many cases, clients and customers 
believe this work to be legal practice and assume that they are 
therefore owed lawyerly duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and care. 
Given the confusion, the profession should examine this work and 
consider whether it should be regulated as legal practice. 
To do so, the ABA and state bars should renew their efforts to 
define legal practice more precisely. As discussed above, state bars 
currently rely on broad and vague definitions of the “practice of law,” 
which generally reference the application of specialized legal 
knowledge and judgment to a particular set of facts or 
circumstances.145 The resulting ambiguity played a large role in 
 
 143. See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 141, at 468 (defining the “cop” and “entrepreneur” 
roles); Parker et al., supra note 141, at 203–04 (reviewing the literature); Tanina Rostain, The 
Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1398–1400 (2006) (discussing the 
rise of lawyers as “law consultants” on business matters). 
 144. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 139, at 974 (explaining various roles of general counsel 
and highlighting ethical tensions arising out of the interplay among roles); Parker et al., supra 
note 141, at 204–05 (offering a quantitative and qualitative study of general counsel in 
Australian corporations).  
 145. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW, supra note 81, at app. A, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_
statutes.pdf (listing each state’s definition). 
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broadening and blurring the boundary between law and business. 
Although some ambiguity is inevitable, much can be eliminated 
through careful and regular review of particular activities performed 
by lawyers and nonlawyers alike (and characterized as legal practice 
in the former instance but not in the latter) to determine which, if 
any, fall clearly within or outside of the profession’s jurisdiction.146 In 
each instance, the risk of harm to consumers, clients, or the public at 
large should guide analysis147 and should be weighed against the desire 
to open the market for legal services and to reduce prices when 
possible.148 For example, a strong argument can be made that when 
compliance officers move beyond monitoring and reporting functions 
and begin advising employees or corporate management, they are 
practicing law. The risk of harm to corporate constituents, who may 
unwittingly waive legal rights or compromise legal positions, is great. 
But given that compliance officers do not purport to offer these 
individuals legal representation, there will be no direct increase in the 
costs of obtaining counsel. Rather, these individuals will simply be on 
notice that retaining counsel may be advisable. 
The goal of an activity-by-activity analysis should be to achieve 
greater clarity when possible, while accepting the inevitable 
ambiguity of the boundary between law and business. Defining legal 
practice broadly, to extinguish the boundary area and to reclassify all 
quasi-legal work, would threaten an unwarranted extension of the 
profession’s jurisdiction and of its monopoly rents. Defining legal 
practice narrowly and business practice broadly would exacerbate the 
existing problems of abuse and ethical arbitrage that flow from 
insufficient regulation. Accordingly, the goal of regularly revisiting 
the definition of legal practice should not be to eliminate the 
ambiguity that exists at the boundary of legal practice, but rather to 
acknowledge it and, to the extent possible, minimize it. 
Second, the profession should develop new and improved forms 
of professional regulation, which are tailored to what we currently 
 
 146. See Soha F. Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now, When? An 
Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1951–59 
(2004) (proposing an “activity-centered approach” to determining what constitutes the practice 
of law). 
 147. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis 
of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 440 (2001).  
 148. See Turfler, supra note 146, at 1911–13 (“[T]he definition of the practice of law directly 
influences competition in the legal services market, which in turn has great influence upon the 
price of legal services.”). 
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know about quasi-legal work’s hybrid nature. New approaches should 
take three forms: heightened disclosure requirements, new rules 
governing transitions into quasi-legal roles, and new rules creating 
baseline conduct standards for all licensed lawyers, practicing or not. 
Heightened disclosure requirements should be designed to guard 
against consumer confusion. Lawyers in quasi-legal roles regularly 
interact with nonlawyers who are not clients. Examples include trust 
officers who interact with bank customers and compliance officers 
who interact with corporate employees. Confusion frequently 
surrounds these interactions as customers and employees may believe 
that lawyerly duties attach to the relationship. The bar addressed the 
potential for confusion in analogous situations by mandating clear 
statements of role and intent. For example, when interacting with 
corporate constituents, a corporation’s lawyer must “explain the 
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the 
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”149 A lawyer interacting 
with an unrepresented individual may not “state or imply that the 
lawyer is disinterested,” and, “[w]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the 
lawyer’s role in the matter, [she must] make reasonable efforts to 
correct the misunderstanding.”150 Lawyers who advertise or solicit 
clients must clearly disclose their names and identities, as well as the 
promotional nature of the communications.151 
Requiring similar transparency regarding quasi-legal roles could 
significantly diminish confusion regarding these lawyers’ duties and 
loyalties. Thus, a licensed lawyer working as a trust officer should be 
required to explain her position immediately upon contacting a 
 
 149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2013). 
 150. Id. R. 4.3. 
 151. See id. R. 7.1 (prohibiting advertising material that “make[s] a false or misleading 
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services”); id. R. 7.2(c) (requiring that 
advertising material “include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm 
responsible for its content”); id. R. 7.3(c) (requiring that written, recorded, or electronic 
communications from a lawyer soliciting business “from anyone known to be in need of legal 
services . . . shall include the words ‘Advertising Material’ on the outside envelope, if any, and at 
the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication”); see also Practice 
Manual: Advertising and Solicitation: Specialization, Certification, and Practice Limitations, 
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT, http://lawyersmanual.bna.com/mopw2 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2014) (with a subscription, under the heading “Practice Guides” click 
“Advertising and Solicitation,” then click “Specialization, Certification, and Practice 
Limitations”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting varied requirements by individual 
states respecting disclaimers in lawyer advertising). 
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potential client and to offer a disclaimer. A compliance officer 
performing an internal investigation should be required to explain to 
employees that she is not acting in her capacity as a lawyer and has no 
special relationship with the employees; rather, her responsibility 
flows directly to management. There is some risk that disclosure to 
someone who is not already aware of an individual’s status as a 
lawyer could exacerbate existing problems by creating heightened 
expectations when none previously existed. This risk could be 
minimized by ensuring that disclosure entails a sufficiently clear and 
comprehensive explanation that heightened expectations are not 
warranted. Disclosure requirements such as these would not remove 
ethical tensions from lawyers’ roles, but they could guard against the 
public’s sometimes mistaken and dangerous beliefs.152 
The profession should also amend its existing rules to address 
problems that arise at transition points between practice and quasi-
legal roles. For example, the provisions governing use of confidential 
information should be strengthened. Rather than solely prohibiting 
lawyers from using information gained in a representation when use 
would be detrimental to a (former) client,153 new provisions should 
prohibit lawyers from using information gained in a representation 
for their own benefit, regardless of the threat of harm to others.154 
This rule, for example, would prohibit someone in a similar position 
to Desmarais from using the information gained in one 
representation to leverage an advantage in another. 
Finally, and most importantly, the profession should impose and 
enforce broad, baseline conduct standards for all licensed lawyers. 
 
 152. Cf. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and “Disclosure 
Advertising”: Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 362 (1994) (proposing a requirement 
that “an attorney who has been sanctioned or disciplined for serious misconduct must carry 
information concerning such sanction or discipline in his advertising materials”). 
 153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (“A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a 
client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client . . . or (2) reveal information relating to the representation 
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.”).  
 154. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (“An agent has a duty (1) not to 
use property of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not 
to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or 
those of a third party.”); id. cmt. c (“An agent’s use of the principal’s confidential information 
for the agent’s own purposes breaches the agent’s duty as stated in subsection (2) although the 
agent’s use of the information does not necessitate revealing it. Thus, it is a breach of an agent’s 
duty to use confidential information of the principal for the purpose of effecting trades in 
securities although the agent does not reveal the information in the course of trading.”). 
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Notwithstanding the strong disagreement between proponents of the 
traditional and segmented models of the profession, broad, unifying 
rules and context-specific regulation need not be antithetical to each 
other. Context-specific, role-based regulation holds a place in legal 
practice and may be valuable in resolving consumer confusion 
regarding quasi-legal roles. Alone, however, it is insufficient to 
prevent sophisticated corporate actors from leveraging legal expertise 
from different sources who are subject to different ethical 
obligations.155 Combining context-specific rules with unifying, baseline 
duties that apply to all lawyers could address this latter issue. 
Moreover, by encouraging and requiring all licensed lawyers to abide 
by certain standards of conduct, these new rules would bolster 
lawyers’ independence and empower them to resist manipulation by 
corporate actors. 
To these ends, the profession may develop several rules over 
time. To start, it should implement baseline duties of candor and fair 
dealing in business transactions. Currently, many jurisdictions impose 
a duty of fair dealing on bankers156 and other financial providers.157 
Following these examples158 and drawing on the fundamentals of 
 
 155. See supra Part II.C. 
 156. See, e.g., Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Bank’s Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4th 1026, § 2[a] (1987 & Supp. June 2013) (reviewing 
cases concluding that a bank’s imposition of excessive service charges could give rise to a cause 
of action for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing); id. § 6[e] (reviewing cases 
concluding that “a bank’s wrongful dishonor of a check could give rise to a successful cause of 
action for breach of the [duty] of good faith and fair dealing”). 
 157. See e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 58.16(2)(a)(2)–(a)(3) (2007) (imposing a duty on a mortgage 
broker to enter into a contract with the borrower describing whether the broker is to receive 
compensation from another source); Grambart v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, Inc., Civ. No. 05-2416, 
2006 WL 1072065, at *1 & n.3 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2006) (indicating that under Minnesota law, “a 
fiduciary relationship exists between a borrower and certain residential mortgage originators”); 
Jones v. USMoney Source, Inc., No. 1:99-CV-1522A-JEC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20400, at *52 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2000) (noting that under Georgia law, a loan broker has a fiduciary duty to a 
homebuyer); McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2006) (finding that a broker violated its fiduciary duty to its customers by engaging in predatory 
and unfair brokering activities). As discussed in Part III.A, however, such duties will not be 
effective if they attach only to particular quasi-legal roles, rather than to all lawyers engaged in 
quasi-legal work. 
 158. An additional example is provided by New Jersey’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2, 
which provides broadly that “[a] lawyer . . . shall treat with courtesy and consideration all 
persons involved in the legal process.” N.J RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2014). Some 
commentators have interpreted this rule to encompass duties to opposing counsel of “respect, 
courtesy and fair dealing, candor in the pursuit of truth, cooperation in all respects not 
inconsistent with the client’s interests, and scrupulous observance of all agreements and mutual 
understandings.” David H. Dugan III, Mandatory Professionalism: RPC 3.2 and the Lawyer’s 
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fiduciary law, jurisdictions should impose an analogous duty on 
licensed lawyers. The new duty would require licensed lawyers to act 
in good faith in all of their business transactions, promoting 
faithfulness to the agreed upon purpose of the transaction and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the party with whom the 
lawyer is transacting.159 
In addition, Model Rule 4.1, “Truthfulness in Statements to 
Others,” should be amended to establish a new duty of candor that 
applies to all licensed lawyers. Currently, Rule 4.1 prohibits lawyers, 
in the course of representing clients, from “(a) mak[ing] a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail[ing] to 
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary 
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless 
disclosure is prohibited by [the confidentiality provisions of] Rule 
1.6.”160 This affirmative duty should be extended in two ways. First, it 
should attach to all licensed lawyers, whether or not they engage in 
client representation.161 Second, a duty to disclose material facts 
should exist not only when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, but also when necessary to comply with the 
lawyer’s duty of fair dealing. Stated otherwise, disclosure should be 
required when the information in question is materially relevant to an 
interaction or transaction, and when, absent disclosure, the 
interaction or transaction could not be viewed as objectively fair. 
Some may object that baseline conduct standards that require 
candor and fair dealing will create new tension in the lawyer’s role, 
particularly in the courtroom context, where justifications for the 
 
Duty To Be Courteous and Considerate, N.J. LAW. MAG., Dec. 2011, at 28, 29. But see id. 
(describing these principles as “only admonitions . . . useful reminders of what courtesy and 
consideration should look like in the everyday practice of law”). 
 159. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The phrase ‘good 
faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good 
faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party . . . .”).  
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. R. 
8.4(c) (prohibiting “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” by attorneys). 
 161. Under some understandings of the profession’s current regulatory regime, this proposal 
does not represent a change. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 98(1) & cmt. b (2000) (providing that a lawyer communicating with “a non-client may 
not . . . knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to the non-client,” and noting 
that “[c]ompliance with those obligations meets social expectations of honesty and fair dealing 
and facilitates negotiation and adjudication”). But see Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of 
Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 L.A. L. REV. 447, 453 (1995) (“Truthfulness and fair dealing 
are not required by the Model Rules.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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primacy of client-centered duties are at their strongest. But, whenever 
there is a client, these new rules will be qualified by duties to the 
client. For example, Model Rule 1.6’s duty of confidentiality to clients 
continues to qualify Model Rule 4.1’s duty of candor.162 Moreover, 
few commentators would dispute that the adversarial excess that 
characterizes litigation today harms clients, third parties, and the 
public at large. Formulating broad conduct standards that apply 
uniformly to all lawyering contexts could productively recalibrate the 
balance between lawyers’ duties to clients and others, including the 
system at large.163 
Compliance with these overarching rules should be framed as a 
cost of the flexibility that a license grants to lawyers to move into, out 
of, and among legal practice settings. Whether or not a licensed 
lawyer works in a role that requires licensure, she retains the 
flexibility to practice if she wishes, so long as she keeps up her license. 
Compliance with new conduct floors would therefore constitute an 
opportunity cost of licensure. It would be a trade-off for the relatively 
greater mobility among workplaces that licensure confers. Breach 
would open a lawyer to possible loss of licensure. 
Some lawyers may respond to these efforts by simply forfeiting 
their licenses or flaunting the rules. But, in both cases, these 
individuals would lose the benefit of their license’s signaling function 
and the flexibility it offers to reenter practice in the future. Although 
they could still use their legal training in problematic ways (such as in 
furtherance of corporate wrongdoing), they would no longer be 
leveraging a connection to the legal profession nor benefiting from its 
reputation for expertise, its heightened ethical standards, and its well-
established set of obligations, protections, and duties. Moreover, their 
problematic conduct would not reflect back on the legal profession, 
thereby undermining its legitimacy. 
A number of obstacles would undoubtedly stand in the way of 
these reforms, including resistance by current participants in the legal 
market. The organized bar may seek to maintain ambiguity at its 
boundaries—by doing so, it could protect its monopoly while 
 
 162. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b). 
 163. Tension has long characterized the relationships among lawyers’ ethical duties. See 
Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should There Be a 
Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 181 (2004) (noting the long-standing tension 
between the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy to the client and the duties of candor and fair 
dealing with others). The goal is not to eliminate tension but to manage it so as to strike a 
desirable balance among duties. 
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supporting its members’ flexibility to perform jobs outside of its 
jurisdiction. Lawyers working in quasi-legal roles would prefer to 
remain free from professional regulation, and sophisticated corporate 
clients would prefer to continue leveraging different sources of legal 
expertise, some subject to professional regulation and some not. 
Meanwhile, the parties likely to support these reforms may be 
poorly positioned to do so. Many of the unsophisticated individuals 
who could be harmed by confusion over lawyers’ roles would lack 
sufficient knowledge or resources to object. And the shareholders and 
amorphous public who would be harmed by excessive market risk and 
corporate malfeasance would probably be too diffuse to act. 
These obstacles do not preclude reform, but rather suggest that 
state courts must play a central role in achieving change. In many 
states, excessively close ties with state bars have compromised state 
courts’ ability to serve as a check on lawyers and bar associations’ 
self-interest.164 However, state courts have a responsibility to serve the 
public and, in furtherance of that responsibility, should reclaim some 
of the regulatory authority and responsibility that they delegated to 
state bar associations. They could do so by designating task forces to 
develop and study proposals for specific rules and, ultimately, by 
adopting new rules. 
As the organized bar begins exploring new forms of regulation, 
the legal academy should pursue educational reform to prepare law 
students for the ethical challenges of the contemporary business 
world. At the very least, law schools should incorporate the ethics of 
quasi-legal work into the curriculum and alert students to the ethical 
challenges of transitioning into and out of quasi-legal roles. With 
many new lawyers transitioning directly into quasi-legal work, 
professional ethical norms must be imbued during law school if they 
are to be shared by all licensed lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyering has changed dramatically in the past century, but 
scholarly and regulatory models have failed to keep pace. These 
models ignore significant and expansive social dynamics that 
broadened and blurred the boundary between law and business. 
Within the resulting quasi-legal zone, lawyers and their clients can 
 
 164. See Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 123, 156 (2011). 
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promote ambiguity about the nature of lawyers’ work and ethical 
obligations. Corporate clients can then leverage lawyers in different 
roles and subject to different ethical obligations to their advantage. 
These changes have eliminated balance in the profession’s 
tripartite orientation toward clients, the state, and the public. In its 
place, they have allowed the corporate sector to derive a 
disproportionate share of the benefits from the profession’s 
monopoly while the state and the public bear a disproportionate 
share of the burdens. Eliminating professional regulation would only 
exacerbate this imbalance. Instead, we should recalibrate professional 
regulation to address the particular challenges faced by licensed 
lawyers in quasi-legal roles. 
There is room as well as need for broad ethical principles, 
context-specific regulations, and better rules governing moves among 
contexts.165 Although neither existing model is alone sufficient, both 
offer important insights. By combining the two models, the profession 
can address the risks of harm arising at the profession’s edges. It can 
take an important step in codifying and enforcing the profession’s 
highest aspirations, and in allowing the public and the state to extract 
the full benefit of the bargain of professional regulation. Accordingly, 
instead of focusing exclusively on factors that draw licensed lawyers 
apart, as the current literature does, we should begin the difficult 
discussions of what core principles bind licensed lawyers together. 
 
 165. Professor Anthony Kronman and others have suggested that a renewed commitment to 
high standards for lawyers cannot be pursued through the rules of professional conduct. Any 
such efforts, they contend, result in mere mechanical applications and arbitrage of rules that 
insufficiently instill and enforce ethical conventions. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE 
LOST LAWYER 365 (1993); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007); 
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 138 (1998). Conversely, I seek ways in which 
ethical principles may be incorporated within the rules as the unifying ethical platform of 
licensed lawyers. Such an approach has the advantage of raising ethical standards for the entire 
bar while allowing for the adoption of specific contextual rules called for by Wilkins and other 
commentators. 
